From the contents: Hoelderlins Trennung von Fichte (Sven Juergensen).- Die Deduktion der Philosophie nach Fichte und Friedrich von Hardenberg (Frank Ruehling).- Fruehromantische Subjektkritik (Christian Iber).- Das Verhaeltnis des Selbst zu Gott in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre (Akira Omine).- Das Wir in der spaeten Wissenschaftslehre (Urs Richli).- Etre et Apparition selon la doctrine de la science de 1812 (Miklos Veto).

Empört über den zunehmenden Einfluß revolutionsfeindlicher Publikationen, wollte Fichte mit seinem anonym erschienenen Beitrag wirksam in den aktuellen politischen Meinungsstreit eingreifen. Dabei verstand er das Recht auf Revolution als Befugnis jedes einzelnen, aus dem eigenen Staat auszuscheiden und mit Gleichgesinnten politisch souveräne Verbände zu konstituieren, die verpflichtet sein sollten, in friedlich-naturrechtlichen Beziehungen miteinander zu leben.

Innerhalb des Gedankenexperiments eines natürlichen Zustandes bewegt sich Meier in der für seine Zeit üblichen Weise der Grundlegung einer Naturrechtslehre mit der Suche nach dem obersten Prinzip, aus dem alle weiteren Grundsätze und Regeln abzuleiten sind. Berücksichtigt man die naturrechtliche Tradition von Christian Wolff und Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, in die sich Meier mehrfach ausdrücklich stellt, würde man nun hier das Gebot des Strebens nach Vollkommenheit erwarten. Doch überraschenderweise legt Meier seinem Recht der Natur ein anderes Prinzip zu Grunde, nämlich: (...) „beleidige niemanden äusserlich in dem natürlichen Zustande.“ Sämtliche natürlichen Rechte und Pflichten des Menschen im Naturzustand folgen für Meier aus diesem ersten Grundsatz, der nun weniger an das Vollkommenheitsgebot des Christian Wolff erinnert als vielmehr eine systematische Parallele zu dem Bereich der für den äußeren Frieden förderlichen Handlungen des justum von Christian Thomasius aufweist, dessen Regel „Behindere andere nicht in der Ausübung ihrer Rechte“ aus den Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium dem Meierschen, „keinem andern Menschen das Seine“ zu nehmen, entspricht. Within the thought-experiment of a natural condition, Meier follows the usual method of his age by basing a doctrine of natural law on the search for a highest principle from which all further principles and rules are to be derived. Considering the tradition of Christian Wolff’s and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in defining natural law, a tradition in which Meier several times expressly places himself, we would expect to find here the commandment to strive for perfection. But, surprisingly, Meier bases his natural law on a different principle: “offend no-one outwardly in the natural condition.” For Meier, all natural laws and duties of mankind in the natural condition follow from this first principle, which now seems less an echo of Christian Wolff’s precept of perfection than a systematic parallel to the sphere of actions required four outward oeace, the justum of Christian Thomasius, whose rule of “Do not hinder others in the exercise of their rights,” from the Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium correspondes to Meier’s rule not to take “from any other man what is his.”. (shrink)

Inhalt: TEIL I Dominik SCHMIDIG: Sprachliche Vermittlung philosophischer Einsichten nach Fichtes Frühphilosophie. Thomas Sören HOFFMANN: Die Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre und das Problem der Sprache bei Fichte. Jere Paul SURBER: Fichtes Sprachphilosophie und der Begriff einer Wissenschaftslehre. Holger JERGIUS: Fichtes »geometrische« Semantik. TEIL II Günter MECKENSTOCK: Beobachtungen zur Methodik in Fichtes Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. Hartmut TRAUB: Wege zur Wahrheit. Zur Bedeutung von Fichtes wissenschaftlich- und populär-philosophischer Methode. Jürgen STAHL: System und Methode - Zur methodologischen Begründung transzendentalen Philosophierens in Fichtes (...) »Begriffsschrift«. Kunihiko NAGASAWA: Eine neue Möglichkeit der Philosophie nach der Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. Teil III Katsuaki OKADA: Der erste Grundsatz und die Bildlehre. Hisang RYUE: Die Differenz zwischen »Ich bin« und «Ich bin Ich«. Christian KLOTZ: Der Ichbegriff in Fichtes Erörterung der Substantialität. Alois K. SOLLER: Fichtes Lehre vom Anstoß. Nicht-Ich und Ding an sich in der Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. Eine kritische Erörterung. Heinz EIDAM: Fichtes Anstoß. Anmerkungen zu einem Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre von 1794. Virginia LÓPEZ-DOMÍNGUEZ: Die Deduktion des Gefühls in der Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. Reinhard LOOCK: Gefühl und Realität. Fichtes Auseinandersetzung mit Jacobi in der Grundlage der Wissenschaft des Praktischen. TEIL IV Marek SIEMEK: Wissen und Tun. Zur Handlungsweise der transzendentalen Subjektivität in der ersten Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes. Daniel BREAZEALE: Der fragwürdige »Primat der praktischen Vernunft« in Fichtes Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. Marcin POREBA: Das Problem der transzendentalen Freiheit in semantischer Formulierung. Giuseppe DUSO: Absolutheit und Widerspruch in der Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. Manuel JIMÉNEZ-REDONDO: Der Begriff des Grundes in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre. TEIL V Helmut GIRNDT: Das »Ich« des ersten Grundsatzes der Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre in der Sicht der Wissenschaftslehre von 18042. Josef BEELER-PORT: Zum Stellenwert der Grundlage aus der Sicht von 1804. Eine Interpretation des Wechsels von analytisch-synthetischer und genetischer Methode in 5 der Grundlage. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Entstehung und die Wirkung von Luther an unsere Zeit, Karl Gottlieb Bretschneiders vielgelesenes Buch der Auszüge, als Fallstudie darüber, wie moderne wissenschaftliche Theologen und Herausgeber Luther gelesen, kommentiert und anderen Lesern vorgestellt haben: in diesem Beispiel als Rationalist. Das Buch war umstritten. Der Beitrag befasst sich auch mit zwei konkurrierenden Auswahlen von Luthers Schriften, die von den konservativeren Protestanten Friedrich Perthes und Hans Lorenz Andreas Vent sowie den ultramontanen Katholiken Nikolaus Weis und Andreas Räß (...) als Antwort verfasst wurden. Es deutet darauf hin, dass eine stärkere Berücksichtigung solcher Zusammenstellungen und der Arbeitsmethoden der Compiler selbst – als Teil der kritischen Geschichte der Wissenschaft – sowohl unser Verständnis des tatsächlichen Einsatzes der Reformer und ihrer breiten Rezeption durch verschiedene Leser bereichern als auch neues Licht werfen wird über die Polemik des frühen neunzehnten Jahrhunderts. This article examines the creation and impact of Luther for Our Time, Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider’s much-read book of excerpts, as a case study of how modern scientific theologians and editors read, annotated, and introduced Luther to other readers: in this instance as a rationalist. The book was controversial. The article also looks at two competing selections of Luther’s texts prepared in response by the more conservative Protestants Friedrich Perthes and Hans Lorenz Andreas Vent and the ultramontane Catholics Nikolaus Weis and Andreas Räß. It suggests that greater consideration of such compilations and the working methods of the compilers themselves – part of the critical history of scholarship – will both enrich our understanding of the actual use of reformers and their broad reception by various readers, as well as shed new light on the polemics of the early nineteenth century. (shrink)

Friedrich Hölderlin argued that consciousness requires division and unity. Consciousness emerges through the fundamental distancing of the subject from its surroundings, without which the subject-object distinction would collapse and both objectivity and consciousness would be lost. Nevertheless, insofar as conscious knowledge is unitary, division demands a ground for unity. Hölderlin calls this ground ‘Being [Seyn].’ However, once Being is affirmed, the question of how it is accessed arises. Hölderlin’s scholars disagreed on this issue. This disagreement gave rise to two (...) camps: those who deny that Hölderlin accepts the idea of direct access to Being and believe that he proves Being through an act of reflection (Henrich); and those who argue that for Hölderlin, ‘Being’ is directly accessed. Those who hold the latter position can be further divided into those who conceive of this direct access as knowledge (Frank) and those who argue that this access does not have a cognoscitive character, but rather an aesthetic one (Waibel). This article considers these positions and shows that the direct apprehension of ‘Being’ is part of Hölderlin’s argument aimed at solving a fundamental problem; an argument that differs both from the postulate of access to Being as knowledge of transcendence and from the affirmation of a purely aesthetic mode of access. (shrink)

This essay examines the earliest reception of Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre focusing on his notion of consciousness as “Wechselbestimmung”. The adoption of this notion leads to a divergent discussion which casts doubts on the idea of a reliable continuity in the history of reception. At this point in history, Fichte’s readers seem to be interested in a cultural aspect of his philosophical argument that is not discussed by him. Fichte is looking for a way to explain the unity of (...) consciousness in a strictly epistemological sense, whereas his poetically orientated readers identify his concept of conflicting consciousness with a cultural problem. Only Holderlin discusses the logical problem addressed by Fichte, but deliberately transfers it into his poetics. Schiller and Friedrich Schlegel discuss the concept of “Wechselwirkung” in respect of problems within modern culture partially evoking a theory of alienation. They are not interested in Fichte’s epistemological problem, even though it also is central to modern subjectivity in philosophical terms.Der Aufsatz untersucht die fruheste Rezeption der Wissenschaftslehre Johann Gottlieb Fichtes im Blick auf seinen Begriff vom Bewusstsein: die „Wechselbestimmung“. Dabei zeigt die Momentaufnahme ein divergentes bis disparates Bild der philosophischen Diskussion, das zur Geltung kommen soll gegenuber einer idealisierten Auffassung von hermeneutisch zuverlassiger Rezeptionsgeschichte. Es wird gezeigt, dass die ‚Rezipienten‘ sich gewisserma.en fur einen externen Aspekt des Theorems interessieren, das in dem philosophischen Werk nicht Thema ist. Wahrend Fichte mit der in Frage stehenden Einheit des Bewusstseins ein Grundproblem der theoretischen Philosophie diskutiert, behandeln seine poetisch ausgerichteten Leser die „Wechselbestimmung“ eher aus kulturkritischer Perspektive. Allein Holderlin setzt sich mit Fichtes eigentlich gemeintem, logischen Widerspruch auseinander, verschiebt seine Darstellung und ‚Losung‘ jedoch bewusst auf die Ebene seiner philosophischen Dichtung. Schiller und Friedrich Schlegel diskutieren unter „Wechselwirkung“ ein Problem der modernen Kultur, das teilweise Zuge einer Entfremdungstheorie annimmt. Sie gehen nicht auf den epistemologischen Gedankengang Fichtes ein, auch wenn dieser ebenfalls ein typisch modernes Problem behandelt: die Moglichkeit von Gewissheit im Rahmen der Subjektivitatsphilosophie. (shrink)

This is a critical edition of a set of particularly detailed and carefully prepared lecture notes, taken down in 1804 during a course on mathematical and experimental physics given at the University of Tübingen by Christoph Friedrich von Pfleiderer. Since Pfleiderer had been appointed to the chair of mathematics and physics in 1782, and had previously held a similar post at the Warsaw Military Academy, when he delivered these lectures he had been teaching the subject for nearly forty years. (...) Besides providing these public courses on “theoretical physics,” he also held private classes in elementary and advanced mathematics and in experimental physics. The lectures were based on a general textbook, which was supplemented with information from a wide range of other sources. Up until the summer term of 1792, they followed the layout of the first edition of a standard work on the subject, Anfangsgründe der Naturlehre, by Wenceslaus Johann Gustav Karsten, professor of the mathematical sciences at Halle. Pfleiderer’s personal copy of this book, annotated in his own hand, is still preserved in the University Library at Tübingen, and throws a lot of light on the precise manner in which he elaborated on the basic text. From 1792 until 1815 he made use of a similar but more up-to-date work, with the same title, by Georg Simon Klügel, and it is therefore this book which forms the basis of the lecture notes now published. At this stage in his career, however, Pfleiderer had got into a well established routine, and the similarities between these 1804 lectures and the manner in which he annotated Karsten, indicate that the notes also give a pretty accurate account of the way in which “theoretical physics” was being taught at Tübingen a decade or so earlier. Like the whole of Pfleiderer’s private collection of books, the manuscript of the notes is preserved in the University Library at Tübingen, which acquired it in 1879. The note taker was Gottlieb Friedrich Harttmann, who studied at Tübingen from 1799 until 1804, subsequently took holy orders and taught at Maulbronn, and eventually emigrated to America. (shrink)

This paper traces the ancestry of a familiar historiographical narrative, according to which early modern philosophy was marked by the development of empiricism, rationalism, and their synthesis by Immanuel Kant. It is often claimed that this narrative became standard in the nineteenth century, due to the influence of Thomas Reid, Kant and his disciples, or German Hegelians and British Idealists. The paper argues that the narrative became standard only at the turn of the twentieth century. This was not due to (...) the influence of Reid, German Hegelians, or British Idealists as they did not endorse the narrative, although Thomas Hill Green may have facilitated its uptake. The narrative is based on Kant’s historiographical sketches, as corrected and integrated by Karl Leonhard Reinhold. It was first fleshed out into full-fledged histories by two Kantians, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and Johann Gottlieb Buhle. Numerous historians, several of whom were not Kantians, spread it in the English-speaking world. They include Kuno Fischer, Friedrich Ueberweg, Richard Falckenberg, and Wilhelm Windelband. However, the wide availability of their works did not suffice to make the narrative standard because, until the 1890s, the Hegelian account was at least as popular as theirs. Among the factors that allowed the narrative to become standard are its aptness to be adopted by philosophers of the most diverse persuasions, its simplicity and suitability for teaching. (shrink)

Friedrich Hölderlin's 1802 “Patmos” poetically answers a theological challenge. Dedicated to the Landgraf von Homburg, it responds unsolicited to the count's call for a poem that might counter contemporary Biblical exegesis, originally addressed to Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock. And indeed, a poetic refutation could hardly be more appropriate, when it comes to Enlightenment theologians : One of the most scandalous texts of the era, Hermann Samuel Reimarus' fragment, “Über die - XVIIIe siècle – Nouvel article.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) was never Kant's student. But when he, as a private teacher without any university degree, anonymously published his first book, the Kritik aller Offenbarung (Critique of all revelation, 1791), even some of the most prominent German philosophers took it to be Kant's long‐expected philosophy of religion. Three years later he became the successor of one of the most influential Kantian philosophers, Karl Leonhard Reinhold, at the famous University of Jena. There he taught and published his (...) theory of the “Science of Knowledge,” which the famous poet and critic Friedrich Wilhelm Schlegel hailed as among the “greatest influences of the age,” together with the French Revolution and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister. It became the origin of post‐Kantian philosophy, later called “German Idealism.” Fichte himself supported the French Revolution and soon got into trouble with conservative student “orders” and with the church authorities (because of his Sunday lectures). In 1798, an article by a friend in his Philosophisches Journal was accused of atheism. Fichte defended it and withdrew from the university in Jena, after troubles with Goethe – the “minister of education” in Weimar – and Herder. (shrink)

This paper revisits the rhetorics of system and irony in Fichte and Friedrich Schlegel in order to theorize the utopic operation and standpoint that, I argue, system and irony share. Both system and irony transport the speculative speaker to the impossible zero point preceding and suspending the construction of any binary terms or the world itself—an immanent nonplace (of the in-itself, nothingness, or chaos) that cannot be inscribed into the world's regime of comprehensibility and possibility. It is because the (...) philosopher and the ironist articulate their speech immanently from this standpoint that system and irony are positioned as incomprehensible to those framed rhetorically as incapable of occupying it. This standpoint is philosophically important, I maintain, because it allows one to think how the (comprehensibility of the) world is constructed without being bound to the necessity of this construction or having to absolutize the way things are or can be. (shrink)

Around 1800, Johann Gottlieb Fichte's primary circle of recipients consisted not only of philosophers, but above all of theologians, religiously engaged laymen, educators, writers and caricaturists, medical practitioner, civil servants and lawyers. The entire reception in post-Kantian philosophy is limited to the years between 1792 and 1810. This period can be divided into two phases: namely the phase up to 1799, in which Fichte acquired students and followers, and the phase from 1799 onwards, in which Fichte's reception was related (...) to the atheism controversy. The discussion about Fichte began to wane in 1810, so that Beneke even claimed in 1833 that Fichte's philosophy "must be regarded as completely lost". Among others, the paper reports on Fichte's disciples such as August Ludwig Hülsen, Johann Gottfried Immanuel Berger, Johann Baptist Schad and sympathisers of Fichte such as Johann Christian Gottlieb Schaumann, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Gottlieb Ernst Mehmel, and Johann Neeb. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper investigates Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1768–1834) use of recognition (Anerkennung) terminology, focusing on the early On Religion (1799) and the late Glaubenslehre (1830). While the term occurs only rarely in On Religion, Schleiermacher speaks of the “recognition of otherness” (Anerkennen des Fremden) in a distinctive fashion in this work. In Glaubenslehre, recognition terminology is frequently used. Here, Schleiermacher considers that the doctrine of justification should be considered as an event in which God recognizes human beings. Recognition is compared (...) with the adoption terminology of the Roman law (agnitio filii). Schleiermacher’s use of the term is to some extent indebted to Johann Joachim Spalding and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. As Schleiermacher highlights the role of feeling, he also participates in the sentimentalist current of the Enlightenment. In theological contexts, however, his view is highly original, replacing the older upward model of a servant recognizing the Lord frequently with downward and horizontal models of religious recognition. Philosophically, Schleiermacher does not embrace Hegelian recognition but moves within the pre-Hegelian models of Fichte and sentimentalism. (shrink)

This paper explores the reception of Kant's understanding of consciousness by both Romantics and Idealists from 1785 to 1799, and traces its impact on the theory of religion. I first look at Kant's understanding of consciousness as developed in the first Critique, and then looks at how figures such as Fichte, Jacobi, Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schleiermacher received this theory of consciousness and its implications for their understanding of religion.

Der Sammelband nimmt seinen Ausgang in einer der prominentesten und lebendigsten Debatten inner-halb der neueren Politischen Theorie, die seit uber einer Dekade intensiv auch in der deutschsprachigen Politischen Theorie gefuhrt wird. Im Zentrum der Diskussion steht die Unterscheidung von Politik und Politischem, in deren Licht die Beitrage des Bandes Fragen der radikalen Demokratie, dem Widerstandigen des Politischen und den Rezeptionslinien dieser wichtigen Debatte nachspuren. Mit Beitragen von Werner Friedrichs, Mareike Gebhardt, Anastasoiya Kasko, Oliver Marchart, Martin Nonhoff, Hagen Scholzel, Karsten (...) Schubert, Manon Westphal und Markus Wolf. (shrink)

Die Entwicklung Schellings von Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795) bis zum Stadium der Identitatsphilosophie, das 1806 abgeschlossen ist, ist Thema dieses Buches. In dieser Zeitspanne findet sich eine stets erneute Beachtung Fichtes, sei es positiver oder negativer Art. Das Anliegen Fichtes und Schellings wahrend dieser Zeit ist verschieden. Fichtes Zentralthema ist ein erkenntnistheoretisches: er will den Grund der Erfahrung darlegen. Schellings Antrieb dagegen ist die Ergrundung oder Darlegung der Realitat.

Summary In 1979, Robert C. Olby published an article titled ?Mendel no Mendelian??, in which he questioned commonly held views that Gregor Mendel (1822?1884) laid the foundations for modern genetics. According to Olby, and other historians of science who have since followed him, Mendel worked within the tradition of so-called hybridists, who were interested in the evolutionary role of hybrids rather than in laws of inheritance. We propose instead to view the hybridist tradition as an experimental programme characterized by a (...) dynamic development that inadvertently led to a focus on the inheritance of individual traits. Through a careful analysis of publications on hybridization by Carl Linnaeus (1707?1778), Joseph Gottlieb Koelreuter (1733?1806), Carl Friedrich Gärtner (1772?1850), and finally Mendel himself, we will show that this development consisted in repeated reclassifications of hybrids to accommodate anomalies, which in the end allowed Mendel to draw analogies between whole organisms, individual traits, and ?elements? contained in reproductive cells. Mendel's achievement was a product of normal science, and yet a revolutionary step forward. This also explains why, in 1900, when the report he gave on his experiments was ?rediscovered?, Mendel could be read as a ?Mendelian? (shrink)

“How does music stand to image and concept?” (KSA 1, 104) This query in the aesthetics of media is central to Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy and related early texts; it shapes both their form and content. Nietzsche searches for a mode of non-conceptual philosophizing; he wishes to organize thought as a sequence of suggestive images – thoughts, that is, about that very relationship. Nietzsche’s success or failure in that endeavour becomes clearer against the foil of the 1795 controversy between (...) class='Hi'>Friedrich Schiller and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. These disputants rigidly opposed concept and image; they identified a potential for mediation, at best, in the aftermath. Yet Nietzsche realizes that concepts are images whose character as such fell into oblivion. He undermines the established opposition, too, by introducing sound as a third medium. In spite of these insights, both Schiller and Fichte get clearer about possible coalescences of media than Nietzsche who, at the end of The Birth of Tragedy, forces their harmony by opting for Wagner’s ‘total work of art’. (shrink)

blurb from publisher: "In Apperception and Self-Consciousness in Kant and German Idealism, Dennis Schulting examines the themes of reflexivity, self-consciousness, representation and apperception in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and German Idealism more widely. Central to Schulting’s argument is the claim that all of human experience is inherently self-referential and that this is part of a self-reflexivity of thought, or what is called transcendental apperception, a Kantian insight that was first apparent in the work of Christian Wolff and came to (...) inform all of German Idealism. In a rigorous text suitable for students of German philosophy and upper-level students of metaphysics, epistemology, moral and political philosophy, and aesthetics courses, the author establishes the historical roots of Kant’s thought and traces it through to his immediate successors Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He specifically examines the cognitive role of self-consciousness and its relation to idealism and places it in a clear and coherent history of rationalist philosophy." . (shrink)

Despite our common self-conceptions, we philosophers have our myths, heroes, and guiding narratives. Our work may emphasize conceptual clarity and deductive arguments, but these more sober and discursive elements of our work always occurs within the context of a broader, often implicit, and frequently illusive orientation, within the scope of some particular vision of our vocation, our history, and our place within the contemporary world. These visions are meta-philosophical: they precede and frame philosophical work, and they engender the most intractable (...) philosophical disputes. Thus, for the sake of self-knowledge and rational discussion, we should constantly struggle to articulate and scrutinize these myths and narratives. Which predecessors do we continue to read? Why? What repeated stories and anecdotes generate our common and competing identities? What do past episodes in the history of philosophy mean, and how do they direct our current endeavors? Like every community, we philosophers sustain our collective work through stories, through the celebration of our heroes, and through repeated reference to paradigmatic arguments and texts. We should reflect upon these sustaining elements of our community, even if this requires modes of thought that lie beyond conceptual analysis, deductive argument, and the careful interpretation of canonical texts. -/- In this paper, I excavate and criticize the contours of one narrative that still guides us, the common celebration of Kant’s critical philosophy as a radical, farsighted, disruptive, irresistible, and irrevocable break with the religious and metaphysical dogmatism of its age. In Section 2, I briefly sketch two complementary versions of this narrative, the accounts provided by the Hegelian philosopher Eduard Gans and by the poet Heinrich Heine. Drawing various parallels with the French Revolution, these thinkers significantly overemphasize the skeptical, destructive, anti-metaphysical, anti-religious and historically discontinuous aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy, which they portray as the inauguration of a new and robust philosophical movement, one that rapidly vanquished its intellectually beleaguered and reactionary opponents. In Sections 2–4, I then turn to consider three of the more active and vociferous opponents of the Kantian movement: Basilius von Ramdohr, Friedrich Nicolai, and Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob. Contrary to the standard version of events, these men had little sympathy for metaphysics, religion, rationalism, and dogmatic certitude. In fact, they principally opposed the Kantian movement as the unwelcome resurgence of an outdated form of quasi-religious enthusiasm, as a form of philosophical Schwärmerei that threatened to appropriate the banner of reason and hinder the progress of enlightenment. -/- Drawing upon a wide range of late eighteenth-century German texts on the dangers and varied manifestations of Schwärmerei, I reconstruct Ramdohr’s, Nicolai’s, and Jakob’s vision of the Kantian movement. I argue that the charges of philosophical Schwärmerei highlight three meta-philosophical disputes that pitted these anti-Kantians against many proponents of the Kantian movement. These disputes involved: (a) the social role of the philosopher and her relation to the general public; (b) the place of internal and/or private experience within the open and polyphonic domain of public discourse; and (c) the merits of philosophical systematicity, technical neologisms, and more hermetic versions of semantic holism. -/- A consideration of these meta-philosophical disputes allows us to position Kant’s critical philosophy more accurately within its historical context, to highlight its significant continuities with the intellectual assumptions of the Berlin Enlightenment, those assumptions that largely inform Ramdohr’s, Nicolai’s, and Jakob’s attacks on the so-called Kantian movement. These continuities then reveal the meta-philosophical distance between Kant and “the Kantian movement”, between the texts of the critical philosophy and the projects of Karl Leonhard Reinhold and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. This challenges the traditional account. We often celebrate Kant’s critical philosophy as a radical break with the past, as the inauguration of new and fundamentally modern assumptions, which were then developed and elaborated by the post-Kantian Idealists. By contrast, I argue for a series of complex, ambivalent, and often unintended breaks: while occasionally celebrating his intellectual achievements as an epochal “Copernican Revolution”, Kant largely remains true to the guiding assumptions and philosophical values of his age, only occasionally deflecting them in minor but portentous ways. By contrast, while Reinhold and Fichte at least initially proclaimed their fidelity to the “spirit” – if not the letter – of Kant’s philosophy, they nonetheless managed to release a new and strange philosophical spirit, a potent, quasi-secularized, and post-Enlightenment form of Schwärmerei. (shrink)

An analysis of the 1784 essays by immanuel kant and moses mendelssohn on the question "what is enlightenment?" emphasis is placed on discussions of the nature and limits of enlightenment within the berlin "aufklarung" as evidenced by debates within the berlin "mittwochsgesellschaft" (a secret society of "friends of the enlightenment") and articles in the "berlinische monatsschrift". Among the views surveyed are those of the publicists johann erich biester, Friedrich gedike, And friedrich nicolai, The jurists karl gottlieb svarez (...) and ernst ferdinand klein, The physician johann karl wilhelm mohsen, And the theologian johann friedrich zollner. (shrink)

A theory is presented to explain how accurate, single-joint movements are controlled. The theory applies to movements across different distances, with different inertial loads, toward targets of different widths over a wide range of experimentally manipulated velocities. The theory is based on three propositions. (1) Movements are planned according to “strategies” of which there are at least two: a speed-insensitive (SI) and a speed-sensitive (SS) one. (2) These strategies can be equated with sets of rules for performing diverse movement tasks. (...) The choice between SI and SS depends on whether movement speed and/or movement time (and hence appropriate muscle forces) must be constrained to meet task requirements. (3) The electromyogram can be interpreted as a low-pass filtered version of the controlling signal to the motoneuron pools. This controlling signal can be modelled as a rectangular excitation pulse in which modulation occurs in either pulse amplitude or pulse width. Movements to different distances and with loads are controlled by the SI strategy, which modulates pulse width. Movements in which speed must be explicitly regulated are controlled by the SS strategy, which modulates pulse amplitude. The distinction between the two movement strategies reconciles many apparent conflicts in the motor control literature. (shrink)

Investigates the concept of recognition (anerkennen) under which term the German idealists discussed the Other, intersubjectivity, the interhuman.

The aim of the paper is to provide a philosophical and historical background to current discussions about the changing relationships between the university and the state through revisiting the classical “Humboldtian” model of the university as discussed in classical German philosophy. This historical detour is intended to highlight the cultural rootedness of the modern idea of the university, and its close links to the idea of the modern national state. The paper discusses the idea of the university as it emerges (...) from the philosophy of Wilhelm von Humbold, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Schleiermacher, as well as - in the 20th century - Karl Jaspers and Jürgen Habermas. More detailed questions discussed include the historical pact between the modern university and the modern nation-state, the main principles of the Humboldtian university, the process of the nationalization of European universities, the national aspect of the German idea of culture (Bildung), and the tension between the pursuit of truth and public responsibilities of the modern university. In discussing current and future missions and roles of the institution of the university today, it can be useful to revisit its foundational (modern) German idea. In thinking about its future, it can be constructive to reflect on the evident current tensions between traditional modern expectations of the university and the new expectations intensified by the emergence of knowledge-based societies and market-driven economies. From the perspective of the tensions between old and new tasks of the university, it is useful to look back at the turning point in its history. (shrink)